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Abstract: 
Most existing evidences for indeterminacy are obtained from analyzing models that do not 
consider trade. This paper considers an extension of Nishimura and Shimomura (Journal of 
Economic Theory, 2002) Heckscher-Ohlin framework by removing sector-specific 
externalities in one country while maintaining all other assumptions previously made by the 
authors. We show that even though indeterminacy arises under autarky, it can be eliminated 
when trade takes place with another country exhibiting saddle-path stability. Consequently, 
support for indeterminacy from calibrating an autarkic framework should be treated with 
some degree of caution. 
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1 Introduction
Recent macroeconomics literature has witnessed a growing interest in dynamic models that may
feature indeterminacy, or a continuum of convergent equilibrium paths. One major focus is the
study on production externalities as a contributing factor to indeterminacy. In their seminal work,
Benhabib and Farmer (1994) introduce production externalities in a one-sector growth model and
show that indeterminacy can arise when increasing returns to scale is large enough. More recently,
Benhabib and Farmer (1996), Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura
(2000) reinforce the earlier findings by showing that the size of externalities needed diminishes with
two or more sectors. These studies present a strong case for the existence of indeterminacy, since
the theoretical criteria for indeterminacy to exist are consistent with the data highlighting small
market imperfections and roughly constant returns to scale in production; see Burnside (1996),
Basu and Fernald (1997).
The one and two-sector Benhabib-Farmer frameworks have stimulated various research along
similar directions. Harrison (2001) and Harrison and Weder (2002) investigate the types of external-
ities necessary to generate indeterminacy in a model with aggregate and sector-specific externalities.
Weder (2001) studies a small open-economy version of two-sector Benhabib-Farmer model and ar-
gues that indeterminacy is more easily attainable when foreign borrowing is permitted. Guo and
Harrison (2001) and Guo and Lansing (1998) examine the effectiveness of different tax schemes in
stabilizing the one and two-sector economy against sunspot fluctuations.
It should be clear that existing works in indeterminacy research are mostly framed in the autar-
kic or the small-open economy context. One exception is Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), who
examine a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model under sector-specific externalities. The authors show
that when private and social factor intensity rankings are the reverse of the other, indeterminacy of
the equilibrium path in the world market is possible. Consequently, the long-run Heckscher-Ohlin
prediction of trade is uncertain, as the realized equilibrium path is indeterminate.
This paper is motivated by Nishimura and Shimomura’s work on trade and indeterminacy,
together with the observation that trade is largely ignored in the literature. We pose the following
question: if a country’s equilibrium path is indeterminate under autarky, can trade with another
whose equilibrium path is unique under autarky lead to the uniqueness of the world equilibrium
path? We follow this line of inquiry by relaxing Nishimura and Shimomura’s original assumption
that the production process in each sector is the same across countries from both private and social
perspectives. The experiment involves removing the sector-specific externalities in one country
while keeping all other assumptions committed by Nishimura and Shimomura. However, doing
so destroys the integrated equilibrium that allows one to analyze to model more easily, but the
problem can be overcome by imposing that factors are internationally immobile. Under autarky, it
can be shown that indeterminacy arises with sector-specific externalities given certain parameter
restrictions, while the equlibrium path is always unique when externalities are absent. However,
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the introduction of trade between the two can easily overturn the indeterminacy property that
previously exists under autarky.
The purpose of the paper primarily serves to highlight an important implication on the choice
of autarkic models used to demonstrate the plausibility of indeterminacy. We note that most
evidences in support of indeterminacy are obtained from calibrating the U.S. economy. Through
these exercises, Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996), Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) claim that the
empirical data fall within the parameter requirements for indeterminacy implied by their model.
However, this paper contends that trade with another saddle-path stable country may remove the
indeterminacy that shows up in the case of autarky. Furthermore, the Heckscher-Ohlin assumption
of identical technology across countries is demanding, although it allows indeterminacy to arise
under both autarky and free trade. For instance, one may expect that the industrial attributes are
different between the U.S. and Japan. Based on the Heckscher-Ohlin framework, indeterminacy can
only take place in both countries if sector-specific externalities exist and factor intensity reversal
occurs in a similar fashion. Therefore, when examining the U.S. economy, one ought to take into
account the technological characteristics of Japan as well. In this respect, supporting evidences for
indeterminacy that are derived from calibrating an autarkic framework such as one describing the
U.S. should be treated with some degree of caution.
2 The Model
The model is outlined as follows. Consider first the home country. The home country is populated
by an infinitely-lived representative agent having an instantaneous utility given by
U(C) =
C1−η
1− η
C denotes the home country’s consumption and 1/η ∈ (1,∞) represents the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption. Labor is inelastically supplied. Let the consumption good and
the investment good, denoted by I, be produced using Cobb-Douglas technology. The agent’s
optimization problem is
Max
C
∫ ∞
0
C1−η
1− η e
−ρtdt (1)
subject to
Iˆ = LaII K
bI
I L
αI
I K
βI
I and Cˆ = L
aC
C K
bC
C L
αC
C K
βC
C (2)
K = KI +KC and L = LI + LC (3)
K˙ = Iˆ + pCˆ − δK − pC (4)
K(0) given
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where ρ ∈ (0,∞) is the subjective rate of time discount and K(0) is the initial capital stock.
Equation (2) describes the production frontier based on Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), where Cˆ
and Iˆ is output level of consumption and investment goods. Since this is a two-country model, the
distinction between the actual consumption and investment levels with the actual output levels has
to be made because only under autarky can we immediately conclude that market clearing implies
C = Cˆ and I = Iˆ. The private factor shares of labor and capital in sector i = I, C are measured
by ai and bi and the externalities associated with labor and capital are represented by Li and
Ki. In both sectors, production exhibits constant returns to scale from the social perspective, i.e.
ai + αi + bi + βi = 1, but decreasing returns to scale from the private perspective, i.e. ai + bi < 1.
Equation (3) describes the resource constraints for capital and labor, both of which are perfectly
mobile across sectors. Equation (4) is capital accumulation process where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital
depreciation allowance. The current value Hamiltonian is
H =
C1−η
1− η + λ(Iˆ + pCˆ − δK − pC) + PI(L
aI
I K
bI
I L
αI
I K
βI
I − Iˆ)
+ PC(L
aC
C K
bC
C L
αC
C K
βC
C − Cˆ) + r(K −KI −KC) + w(L− LI − LC)
where PI , PC , r and w are the Lagrange multipliers representing the shadow price of investment,
consumption, capital and labor respectively. Let p be the price of consumption in terms of invest-
ment. Differentiating the Hamiltonian with respect to Iˆ and Cˆ yield
λ = PI
λp = PC
Combining the above, one has p = PC/PI . Next, define r = r/PI and w = w/PI . The remaining
necessary conditions are
C−η = λp (5)
w = aIL
aI−1
I K
bI
I L
αI
I K
βI
I = paCL
aC−1
C K
bC
C L
αC
C K
βC
C (6)
r = bIL
aI
I K
bI−1
I L
αI
I K
βI
I = pbCL
aC
C K
bC−1
C L
αC
C K
βC
C (7)
λ˙ = λ(ρ+ δ − r) (8)
lim
t→0
K(t)λ(t)e−ρt = 0 (9)
Equation (5) expresses the equality between the marginal utility and the marginal cost of consump-
tion while (8) represents the intertemporal arbitrage condition. Equations (6) and (7) state the
equalization of the marginal revenue product of labor and of capital across sectors. Equation (9)
is the transversality condition. Note that (6) and (7) consist of four equations in four unknowns,
namely LI , LC , KI and KC . They are implicitly solved in terms of w and r, which are in turn
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determined by pinning down p. The relationship between total income from the private and the
social perspectives can be expressed as
wL+ rK +Π =WILI +RIKI +WCLC +RCKC
(
= Iˆ + pCˆ
)
(10)
where Π is the firm’s profit due to private decreasing returns to scale, Wi and Ri are the social
wage and rental income in sector i respectively. Using the fact that production functions exhibit
constant returns to scale, Li and Ki can be expressed as functions of Wi and Ri. This is done by
setting Li = Li, Ki = Ki, ai + αi = θi and bi + βi = 1− θi in (2) and observing that
Wi = piθiLθi−1i K
1−θi
i (11)
Ri = pi (1− θi)Lθii K−θii (12)
where pi = 1 for i = I and pi = p for i = C. Note that Wi and Ri may differ across sectors.
Equations (11) and (12) can be equivalently represented by
Wili = piθi (13)
Riki = pi (1− θi) (14)
where li and ki are the unit labor and capital requirement respectively. Using (13) and (14), the
two social zero profit conditions in the goods markets are
1 =WI lI +RIkI (15)
p =WC lC +RCkC (16)
Due to social constant returns to scale, the unit input requirements are functions of social income
alone. Equations (11) and (12), combined with (6) and (7) yield two useful relationships:
Wi =
θi
ai
w (17)
Ri =
1− θi
bi
r (18)
By substituting the social income levels from (17) and (18) into (15) and (16), and log-differentiating
the social zero profit functions with respect to p, we obtain the Stolper-Samuelson conditions as
pr′(p)
r(p)
=
θI
θI − θC (19)
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pw′(p)
w(p)
=
1− θI
θC − θI (20)
where θC − θI measures the social factor intensity ranking. θC − θI > 0 holds if labor is socially
more intensive in the consumption sector, and the inequality reverses if the converse is true. It
turns out that the Stolper-Samuelson conditions, which express the price elasticities of wage and
rental income, are the same even when production externalities are absent.
Applying Shephard’s Lemma to (15) and (16), the factor clearing conditions can be expressed
as (
lI lC
kI kC
)(
Iˆ
Cˆ
)
=
(
L
K
)
(21)
The system of equations in (21) contains two unknowns Iˆ and Cˆ, which can be solved using (13),
(14), (17) and (18) to obtain
Iˆ =
bCw(p)L− aCr(p)K
∆
(22)
Cˆ =
aIr(p)K − bIw(p)L
p∆
(23)
where ∆ = aIbC − aCbI measures the private factor intensity ranking. In particular, ∆ > 0 can be
obtained with aI > aC , where labor is privately more intensive in the investment sector, together
with bC > bI , where capital is privately more intensive in the consumption sector. Substituting Iˆ
and Cˆ from (22) and (23) into (4), we have
K˙ =
aIr(p)K − bIw(p)L
∆
+
bCw(p)L− aCr(p)K
∆
− δK − pC (24)
Equations (8) and (24) govern the law of motion for the home country.
The foreign country differs from the home country through the absence of sector-specific ex-
ternalities. Distinguishing the foreign country’s variables by the asterisk, the production functions
are
Iˆ∗ = L∗θII K
∗1−θI
I and Cˆ∗ = L
∗θC
C K
∗1−θC
C (25)
Assume that the size of the labor force is the same in both countries. The dynamic equations
governing the evolution of the foreign country are
K˙∗ = w∗(p)L+ r∗(p)K∗ − δ∗K∗ − pC∗ (26)
λ˙∗ = λ∗ (ρ∗ + δ∗ − r∗(p)) (27)
where p = p∗ given that free trade takes place. Equations (26) and (27), together with (8) and (24)
determine the dynamics of the two-country world economy. Since social technologies are the same
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as the home country’s, the Stolper-Samuelson conditions are
pw∗(p)
w∗(p)
=
1− θI
θC − θI (28)
pr∗(p)
r∗(p)
=
θI
θI − θC (29)
In equilibrium, the trade balance for consumption good is given by
(λp)−1/η + (λ∗p)−1/η =
aIr(p)K − bIw(p)L
p∆
+
θIr
∗(p)K∗ − (1− θI)w∗(p)L
p(θI − θC) (30)
To simplify the analysis, the system is reduced by one dimension. The following lemma and
assumption are useful for this purpose.
Lemma 1. There is a constant ξ > 1, determined from r∗(0) = ξr(0), that solves r∗(t) = ξr(t) for
t ∈ [0,∞).
Proof. Available upon request. 
Assumption 1. ρ
∗+δ∗
ξ = ρ+ δ
Assumption 1 is time invariant since ξ is a constant. Given the above, we have
Lemma 2. Under Lemma 1 and Assumption 1, λ∗ = mλξ holds for t ∈ [0,∞).
Proof. By Lemma 1, Equation (27) is equivalent to
λ˙∗
λ∗
1
ξ
=
ρ∗ + δ∗
ξ
− r(p)
which together with Assumption 1 can be written as
λ˙∗
λ∗
= ξ
λ˙
λ
This expression is integrated to obtain λ∗ = mλξ, where m > 0 is a constant. 
Using Lemma 2, the model’s behavior is described by the following system of three equations
K˙ =
aIr(p)K − bIw(p)L
∆
+
bCw(p)L− aCr(p)K
∆
− λ−1/ηp1−1/η − δK (31)
K˙∗ = w∗(p)L+ r∗(p)K − (mλξ)−1/ηp1−1/η − δ∗K∗ (32)
λ˙ = λ(ρ+ δ − r(p)) (33)
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The steady state price level is obtained by setting λ˙ = 0 in (33). Totally differentiating the trade
balance equation for consumption yield
dp
dK
= − ΣaI(ρ+ δ)
∆
(
(λp)−1/η + (mλξp)−1/η
) (34)
dp
dK∗
= − ΣθI(ρ
∗ + δ∗)
(θI − θC)
(
(λp)−1/η + (mλξp)−1/η
) (35)
dp
dλ
= −pΣ
(
(λp)−1/η + ξ(mλξp)−1/η
)
ηλ
(
(λp)−1/η + (mλξp)−1/η
) (36)
where
1
Σ
=
1
η
− 1 +
θIr
′∗(p)K∗−(1−θI)w′∗(p)L
θI−θC +
aIr
′(p)K−bIw′(p)L
∆
(λp)−1/η + (mλξp)−1/η
(37)
Due to the intractable nature of the problem, we choose ρ∗ such that
Assumption 2. ρ∗ = (aI−aC)r(p)−δ∆∆ > 0
Define γ =
(
(aI−aC)r(p)−δ∆
∆
)
. Using (34), (35), (36) and (37), the linearization of (31), (32),
and (33) yield Jacobian matrix J with determinant
Det(J) =
pr′(p)
η
(
−ρ∗γλη
p
dp
dλ
+ ρ∗(λp)−1/η
dp
dK
+ ξγ(mλξp)−1/η
dp
dK∗
)
(38)
Now consider two cases. First, suppose ∆ < 0 and θI − θC < 0. In this case, factor intensity
rankings from the private and social perspectives are the same.
Definition. The equilibrium path is a sequence {p(t), w(t), w∗(t), r(t), r∗(t)}∞t=0 and {K(t),K∗(t), λ(t)}∞t=0
such that for each t, the sequence i) solves the representative agent’s problem, ii) satisfies (31), (32)
and (33) given the initial stock of capital and the transversalilty condition for each country, and
iii) clears all factor markets and trade balances.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium path is unique.
Proof. The model’s behavior can be analyzed by straightforward application of the Routh Theo-
rem.1 Since ∆ < 0 and θI − θC < 0, we know that Σ > 0, which implies that both dp/dK and
dp/dK∗ are positive and dp/dλ is negative. Moreover, θI − θC < 0 implies that r′(p) < 0 and
therefore Det(J) < 0. Since Trace(J) contains both positive and negative terms, we consider two
1The Routh Theorem states that the number of changes in signs in the following scheme
-1 Trace(J) −F + Det(J)
Trace(J)
Det(J)
indicates the number of eigenvalues with positive parts, where F is the sum of the minor matrices c11c22 − c21c12,
c11c33 − c31c13, c22c33 − c23c32.
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cases:
1. Trace(J) > 0. The signs must change twice, regardless of the sign of −F + Det(J)Trace(J) , and hence
there are two eigenvalues with positive real part and one with negative real part. Since λ is the
only non-predetermined variable, the steady state is saddle-path stable.
2. Trace(J) < 0. Appendix 1 demonstrates that −F + Det(J)Trace(J) is always positive if Trace(J) < 0.
Once again, the signs must change twice, Hence, the steady state is always saddle-path stable. 
Next, consider ∆ > 0, θI − θC < 0 and Σ > 0. In this case, private and social factor intensity
rankings differ.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the equilibrium path is unique if
C∗
C
∈
(
(aI(ρ+ δ)− ρ∗∆)(θC − θI)
ξ(ρ∗θC + δ∗θI)∆
,∞
)
(39)
Proof. With r′(p) < 0 and Assumption 2, the determinant is negative as long as
−ρ∗λη
p
dp
dλ
+ (λp)−1/η
dp
dK
+ ξ(mλξp)−1/η
dp
dK∗
> 0 (40)
If the trace is positive, the steady state is saddle-path stable. Otherwise, saddle-path stability
arises for −F + Det(J)Trace(J) > 0. This is satisfied as long as (40) holds.2 Using (34), (35), (36), and
the fact that C = (λp)−1/η and C∗ = (mλξp)−1/η, we can express (40) as (39). 
We state without proof that under autarky, indeterminacy arises in the home country for ∆ > 0,
θI − θC < 0 and Σ > 0 while the equilibrium path is always unique for the foreign country.3 By
introducing trade, saddle-path stability exists in both countries whenever (39) is satisfied. In this
respect, Proposition 2 asserts that even though indeterminacy may arise under autarky, determinacy
may be effected through trade. If such situation is ruled out categorically, examining an autarkic
model to ascertain the dynamic properties of an economy will lead us to appropriate conclusions
about the existence of indeterminacy. Otherwise, results obtained from such a study could be
misleading, as indeterminacy may show up under autarky when determinacy is the actual outcome.
To determine the restrictiveness of the sufficient condition, consider the benchmark model:
[Insert Table 1 here]
Consistent with empirical data, the numerical values assumed show that the quantities of exter-
nalities are very small. In addition, we impose aI > aC given bI < bC so that ∆ > 0, otherwise
2Derivation available upon request.
3Details available upon request.
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indeterminacy may not arise. Hence, the benchmark parameters imply that θI−θC = −0.0001 and
∆ = 0.01247. Furthermore, by setting ρ = 0.05 and δ = 0.05, a foreign discount rate of ρ∗ = 0.03019
satisfies Assumption 2. Finally, the lower bound for sufficiency is larger the closer ξ is to one since
ξ > 1. In the limiting case, setting ξ = 1 implies that if C∗/C satisfies the sufficient condition
for this lower bound, it will satisfy the sufficient condition for any ξ > 1. Given these values,
the sufficient condition is met as long as C∗/C is greater than approximately 7.8915 × 10−3. For
example, if sector-specific externalities are absent in the U.S. major trading partners, say Canada
and Japan, then the private consumption ratios (in 1997) of 0.05738 with Canada and 0.50633 with
Japan indicate that indeterminacy may not emerge in the U.S. after all, contrary to the earlier
conclusions made.4
3 Conclusion
The motivation of this paper is to question the use of an autarkic framework to examine the plau-
sibility of indeterminacy. We consider an extension of Nishimura and Shimomura by removing
externalities in one country while maintaining all other original assumptions of the authors. Under
autarky, indeterminacy may arise with sector-specific externalities, but uniqueness is always the
case when externalities are absent. Indeterminacy will continue to hold in two-country world econ-
omy if both countries share the same production specifications, externalities are present, and factor
intensity rankings from the private and social perspectives are the reverse of the other. However,
relaxing the assumption about the existence of externalities in one country may remove indeter-
minacy in the world economy. Therefore, the paper cautions against the use of an autarkic model
in indeterminacy research since it may not be sufficient in helping us obtain the desired conclu-
sion. For example, examining an autarkic framework may lead us to believe that indeterminacy
is plausible, while in reality, the equilibrium path could be determinate depending on the produc-
tion characteristics of the other countries. The Heckscher-Ohlin assumption of identical technology
across countries is non-trivial, notwithstanding the fact that a common production specification
for both countries, both from the private and the social perspectives, is a difficult one to envisage.
In this respect, the criteria for indeterminacy are more stringent than one might imagine and the
plausibility of indeterminacy may be overstated by evidences based on theoretical models that do
not take trade into account.
4Based on our calculation from the OECD Business Sector Database.
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Appendix 1
The Jacobian matrix is
J =
c11 c12 c13c21 c22 c23
c31 c32 c33

where
c11 =Λ
dp
dK
+
(aI − aC)r(p)− δ∆
∆
c21 =Γ
dp
dK
c31 =− λr′(p) dp
dK
c12 =Λ
dp
dK∗
c22 =ρ∗ + Γ
dp
dK∗
c32 =− λr′(p) dp
dK∗
c13 =Λ
dp
dλ
+
p(λp)−1/η
ηλ
c23 =Γ
dp
dλ
+
ξp(mλξp)−1/η
ηλ
c33 =− λr′(p)dp
dλ
and
Λ =
aIr
′(p)K − bIw′(p)L
∆
+
bCw
′(p)L− aCr′(p)K
∆
+
(1− η)(λp)−1/η
η
Γ = w∗′(p)L+ r∗′(p)K∗ +
(1− η)(mλξp)−1/η
η
The proof that −F + Det(J)Trace(J) > 0 given Trace(J) < 0 is as follows. First, write −F + Det(J)Trace(J) >
0 as − 1Trace(J)(F Trace(J) − Det(J)). Since − 1Trace(J) > 0, −F + Det(J)Trace(J) > 0 if and only if
F Trace(J)−Det(J) > 0. We define
X =c11c22 − c21c12 = ρ∗γ + ρ∗Λ dp
dK
+ γΓ
dp
dK∗
Y =c22c33 − c23c32 = −ρ∗λr′(p)dp
dλ
+ r′(p)
ξp
η
(mλξp)−1/η
dp
dK∗
Z =c11c33 − c31c13 = −γλr′(p)dp
dλ
+ r′(p)
p
η
(λp)−1/η
dp
dK
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where F = X + Y + Z. Write F Trace(J) as
(X + Y + Z)Trace(J)
= Trace(J)X +
(
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
∂K
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)
Y + γY
− Trace(J) γλr′(p)dp
dλ
+
(
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
dK
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)(
r′(p)
p
η
(λp)−1/η
dp
dK
)
+ γr′(p)
p
η
(λp)−1/η
dp
dK
The second line is derived by expanding Trace(J) in Trace(J)Y , the third and last line are derived
by expanding both Trace(J) and Z in Trace(J)Z. After rearranging, we obtain
(X + Y + Z)Trace(J)
= Trace(J)X +
(
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
dK
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)
Y
− Trace(J) γλr′(p)dp
dλ
+
(
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
dK
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)(
r′(p)
p
η
(λp)−1/η
dp
dK
)
+ γ
(
Y + r′(p)
p
η
(λp)−1/η
dp
dK
)
By Assumption 2,
(X + Y + Z)Trace(J)−Det(J)
= Trace(J) (X − γλr′(p)dp
dλ
) +
(
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
dK
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)
Y
+ r′(p)
(
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
dK
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)(
p
η
(λp)−1/η
dp
dK
)
(41)
In addition, Trace(J) < 0 and Assumption 2 imply
(
ρ∗ + Λ dpdK + Γ
dp
dK∗ − λr′(p) ddλ
)
< 0 and
Trace(J) (X − γλr′(p)dp
dλ
)
= γTrace(J)
(
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
dK
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)
> 0
Since Y < 0, (
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
dK
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)
Y > 0
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Furthermore, dp/dK > 0 and r′(p) < 0 imply
r′(p)
(
ρ∗ + Λ
dp
dK
+ Γ
dp
dK∗
− λr′(p)dp
dλ
)(
p
η
(λp)−1/η
dp
dK
)
> 0
Therefore, F Trace(J)−Det(J) > 0. 
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Table 1: Benchmark specification of the model economy
aI = 0.3 αI = 0.001 bI = 0.68 βI = 0.019
aC = 0.29 αC = 0.0111 bC = 0.6989 βC = 0
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